CIA Ran MK-ULTRA Experiments on Prisoners of War in U.S. Custody, Declassified Docs Confirm

Korean prisoners of war in the 1950s were subjected to early MK-ULTRA experiments while in American custody, according to recently declassified CIA documents which confirm these experiments for the first time.

The only reporting that previously referenced Koreans being used as guinea pigs for these experiments was journalist John Marks’s landmark 1979 book, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate.” Using CIA documents, Marks traced the now-infamous MK-ULTRA project to its start, when it was known as Project Bluebird. In the book, Marks describes how, in October 1950, 25 unnamed North Korean POWs were chosen as the first test subjects to receive “advanced” interrogation techniques, with the overt goal of “controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation.”

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While MK-ULTRA is best known for its invasive experimentation — like LSD dosing and torture — the documents confirm Korean POWs were the unwitting subjects of less splashy attempts at mind control, like being subjected to polygraph tests, with plans for other invasive testing.

The declassified documents, which the National Security Archive released between December 2024 and April 2025, are available through a special collection titled “CIA and the Behavioral Sciences: Mind Control, Drug Experiments and MK-ULTRA.” The National Security Archive website states that the collection “brings together more than 1,200 essential records on one of the most infamous and abusive programs in CIA history.”

The first reference to “Project Bluebird” in the NSA’s collection is an office memorandum from April 5, 1950. Addressed to CIA Director Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the document lays out the project’s goals, required training, and budget, all while emphasizing that knowledge of Project Bluebird “should be restricted to the absolute minimum number of persons.”

The memo includes detailed plans for interrogation teams trained to utilize the polygraph, various drugs, and hypnotism “for personality control purposes.” These teams were to be made up of three people: a doctor (ideally a psychiatrist), a hypnotist, and a polygraph technician. The memo clarifies that while the doctor and technician would need to undergo approximately five months of training, the Inspection and Security Staff’s own department hypnotist could be made available immediately. In a later memo from February 2, 1951, there are inquiries into acquiring six “hypospray” devices: experimental instruments designed to covertly inject sedatives through the skin via “jet injection.” There’s a request to investigate modification of a “tear gas pencil” and other “devices of unestablished action,” such as the “German ‘Scheintot’ [sic] (appearance of death) pistol.”

This declassified 1951 CIA memo on Project Bluebird, a precursor to MK-ULTRA, details its interest in testing “hypospray” technology. Screenshot: CIA/National Security Archive

The project’s proposed budget of $65,515 accounted for team salaries and equipment like syringes, towels, and film cameras. The budget also allots $18,000 for “Transportation,” and while the actual offshore locations are redacted, a write-up of a CIA meeting held one year later specifically notes a “project in Japan and Korea in which the Army had used a polygraph operator along with a team of psychiatrists and psychologists on Korean POWs.” 

Although the initial proposal for Project Bluebird mostly emphasized the potential for “personality control,” it’s clear that CIA officials were also interested in broader, more ambitious outcomes. One document summarizing a “special meeting” between U.S., British, and Canadian intelligence services notes the CIA’s desire to research “the psychological factors causing the human mind to accept certain political beliefs” and “determining means for combatting communism,” “‘selling’ democracy,” and preventing the “penetration of communism into trade unions.” Another meeting held on May 9, 1950, called for “the Surgeon General of the Army to place on the search list of the Nuremberg Trials papers request for information on drugs, narcoanalysis, and special interrogation techniques.” 

There were requests for other tests that, at the time, were deemed “impossible for security reasons.” According to a memo from September 18, 1951, this included “experiments on the outside with SI inducted over the telephone.” The writer explains that this over-the-phone hypnosis has, so far, been “universally successful,” however testing along agency lines was yet to be approved. 

One declassified memo emphasizing the importance of the project gets more detailed, citing “specific problems which can only be resolved by experiment, testing and research.” Unlike the lists of supplies necessary for Project Bluebird, the “specific problems” officials hoped to explore in the experiments offer a uniquely intimate perspective into the bureau’s interests. A few examples of these “problems” include: 

• “Can we create … an action contrary to an individual’s basic moral principles?”
• “Could we seize a subject and in the space of an hour or two … have him crash an airplane, wreck a train, etc.?”
• “Can we ‘alter’ a person’s personality? How long will it hold?” 
• “Can we guarantee total amnesia under any and all conditions?” 

This last question surrounding drug-induced amnesia would prove incredibly relevant months later, when the first team of Project Bluebird technicians arrived in Japan to carry out initial tests. According to Marks, these men “tried out combinations of the depressant sodium amytal with the stimulant benzedrine on each of four subjects, the last two of whom also received a second stimulant, picrotoxin.” The team was attempting to induce a state of medically administered amnesia, and according to their reports, the experiments proved successful enough to pursue further tests. Two months later, according to Marks’s book, the Project Bluebird team began testing more “advanced” interrogation techniques on 25 North Korean prisoners of war in Japan.

This declassified CIA memo from April 5, 1950 recounts the budget and personnel requested to carry out these secret experiments. Screenshot: CIA/National Security Archive

Notably absent from these declassified documents is any proof that similar experiments were undertaken by enemies of the U.S. The central animating myth behind MK-ULTRA and Project Bluebird is the narrative of the American soldier who returned home after months of imprisonment by enemy forces, only to be revealed as a hypnotized double agent. Throughout the Korean War, American moviegoers were screened films starring and narrated by future president Ronald Reagan. These films showed American troops being psychologically tortured by Chinese and North Korean soldiers until dangerous, anti-democratic ideals were implanted in their minds without their knowledge.

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The knowledge most Americans have about these experiences are based on a work of fiction: Richard Condon’s 1959 political thriller, “The Manchurian Candidate.” In Condon’s book (and its two film adaptations), an American soldier returns home with a secret, one that he himself isn’t even aware of. While held captive by North Korean and Chinese soldiers, the American POW was brainwashed by enemy troops, unknowingly turning him into a sleeper assassin with the goal of being “activated” to kill a presidential nominee. 

Throughout these declassified documents are numerous reminders that the Korean War’s label as “The Forgotten War” serves, in part, as intentional obfuscation.

As Project Bluebird transformed into Project Artichoke and later MK-ULTRA, the CIA’s goals seemed to shift into one of beating the enemy at their own game. Essentially, programs surrounding psychological experiments were deemed necessary evils after our own troops were coming home hypnotized and transformed by our enemies. While this narrative offers a convenient excuse for why the CIA developed programs like Bluebird in the first place, one declassified document tells a different story. 

This declassified CIA account of a meeting on August 8, 1951, confirms that Korean POWs were the subject of these experiments.  Screenshot: CIA/National Security Archive

In a 1983 witness testimony from CIA chemist Sidney Gottlieb, who led the MK-ULTRA experiments, he recalls receiving confirmation that, after thorough investigation, there was no evidence any American POWs were subjected to drug-induced hypnosis at any point during the Korean War. “As I remember it,” Gottlieb said, “[The report] basically said that they felt that the techniques the Chinese and/or the Koreans used were not esoteric. … [They] didn’t depend upon sophisticated techniques used in drugs and other more technical means.” Additionally, a 1952 memo to Allen Dulles reinforces the CIA’s willingness to fund these experiments without any proof that enemy countries were undergoing similar research: “We cannot accept this lack of evidence as proof.”

In one of the more revealing moments from the entire collection of documents, the CIA’s Morse Allen recounts a conversation with an agency employee about the effectiveness of interrogating individuals through hypnosis. “Individuals under hypnotism will give information,” Allen writes, “but … it could not always be regarded as accurate, since fantasy and even hallucinations are present in certain hypnotic states.” Reading the lengthy budgetary sheets for drugs, syringes, polygraph machines, and hypnotists, paired with the details of Marks’s book, one’s imagination begins trying to fill in the gaps, drifting into fantasy. It’s an experience uniquely fitting for research into the CIA’s pursuit of technology aimed at erasing facts, experiences, and memories.

Throughout these declassified documents are numerous reminders that the Korean War’s label as “The Forgotten War” serves, in part, as intentional obfuscation. People, histories, and crimes are rarely forgotten on accident, and what these disclosures clearly demonstrate is that there remains a world of difference between the forgetting of history and its swift, coordinated erasure.

The post CIA Ran MK-ULTRA Experiments on Prisoners of War in U.S. Custody, Declassified Docs Confirm appeared first on The Intercept.

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