After the Blue Wave, What Comes Next?

· The Atlantic

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In this episode of The David Frum Show, The Atlantic’s David Frum opens with his thoughts on a coming constitutional crisis for the incoming Democrat majority.

Then, David is joined by Neera Tanden, the president and CEO of the Center for American Progress, for a discussion about what comes next following the 2026 blue wave. David and Neera discuss Democratic infighting, how a majority can fight Trump, and what might happen in 2028.

Finally, David ends the episode with a discussion of Robert Darnton’s The Literary Underground of the Old Regime.

The following is a transcript of the episode:

Neera Tanden: The actual way to address the MAGA threat in the country is to create a big-tent coalition that includes the left. Let me say that again: includes the left. But also includes Democrats, independents, and some Republicans.

[Music]

David Frum: Hello, and welcome to The David Frum Show. I’m David Frum, a staff writer at The Atlantic. My guest this week will be Neera Tanden, president of the Center for American Progress, and we’ll be discussing the opportunities and the challenges facing the new Congress elected in November of 2026.

This week’s book will be Robert Darnton’s The Literary Underground of the Old Regime, a study of smut and scandal in prerevolutionary France, and some of the light it casts on how our media works in the modern world of the 21st century.

But before either the dialogue or the book discussion, some opening thoughts about a constitutional crisis that the country is fast hurtling toward.

The new Congress elected in 2026 wants a lot of information from the Trump administration about the interior goings-on, and the Trump administration has made it clear that it will not be cooperating. On November 9th, the White House counsel, William Scharf, wrote a letter to Robert Garcia, who heads the Oversight Committee in the House of Representatives, that began: “Dear Congressman Garcia, I want to remind you of the foundational limits that the Constitution imposes on congressional investigations and subpoenas, which you and members of the new Congress have evinced a clear intent to transgress.” And it goes on through three pages to conclude, “The Trump Administration expects members of Congress to discharge their investigative functions within settled constitutional limits. The Administration will not be extorted and will not be cowed by unlawful process motivated by animus, pettiness, hatred, or any other unlawful motive to intimidate, penalize, or interfere with the lawful functioning of government.”

And there’s a threat. “Beyond being inconsistent with the clear, well-recognized constitutional limitations on your investigative functions, threats to executive branch officials designed to deter them from public service or process designed merely to abuse or instill fear in the recipient may cross the line into blatant criminality, and issuing unlawful subpoenas with the intention of depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges may warrant further investigation.” In other words, the White House is saying, If Congress sends subpoenas that we don’t like, we’re going to try to prosecute members of Congress.

Now, that may be a little too high-minded, so let me read to you now a Twitter post, or an X post, from a U.S. attorney in Texas. This is addressed to Senator Elizabeth Warren, and just forgive me, I’m just going to read this charming post in exactly the language it was written: “@SenatorWarren is on the warpath to wield her committee gavel like a tomahawk, seeking the scalps of those who associate ‘too closely’ with President Trump. Congressional investigations can’t be used to punish Americans for exercising their First Amendment rights. My first arrow shot.” And then it includes a copy of a letter.

So that takes the same point that Counsel Scharf has made and just adds a little extra season of spite and nastiness to make the point they’re not going to be complying with the subpoenas.

Now I don’t think there’s any sign of anybody retreating or relaxing in this confrontation. And one of the first things that’s going to happen is Congress is going to try to find out things, the administration is going to refuse—and not to refuse just through stonewalling and obstruction and delay, but through outright confrontation and counter-threats. And this is going to set the stage for battles in the courts, battles in the court of public opinion, and it’s all hurtling toward us at fantastic speed. So let’s start with some thoughts about what the administration can do and can’t do, and what the Congress can do and can’t do.

It needs to be said at the beginning: The Constitution does not give Congress oversight rights. It does not mention congressional subpoenas. That’s not in the Constitution any more than presidential immunity is in the Constitution. Courts have derived these powers from the logic and structure of the Constitution, and they’ve worked out as a consequence, since Congress can impeach, since Congress can legislate, since Congress controls the purse, Congress should be able to ask questions necessary to its work. And there are a long line of court cases building up to the power of congressional subpoena.

To simplify the story a little bit, those congressional powers got bigger and bigger and bigger through the 19th and into the 20th centuries, and sort of came to their peak in the middle 1970s. But recently, they’ve come under pressure from the courts.

The most important recent case on congressional investigative power is the Mazars case. This is the case where Congress sought information about President Trump’s personal financial activities. And Trump fought this at the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said, Yeah, Congress can ask these questions. But it then added, But remember, these questions have to have a legit legislative purpose.

This is coupled with other things that the courts have done—not the Supreme Court, but lower federal courts—that just make it more difficult to enforce a subpoena. The courts do not question the right of the subpoena, but they are not in recent years as helpful as they were in the 1970s and ’80s to the enforcement of subpoenas.

So the theoretical power is there with the asterisk that the Supreme Court put on it in the Mazars case, but the practical efficacy of the subpoena is much less than it was or somewhat less than it was a generation ago. And now Congress is confronting an administration that is just utterly determined, as I say, to defy them, to fight, to threaten, and to resist.

So we are on our way to, really, a battle over the question: Can Congress ask questions of the president? Can Congress track allegations or suspicions of corruption and malfeasance? Can Congress enforce its own laws against the executive branch? Under the supervision, or to be arbitrated by, a Supreme Court that is very much tilted in the direction of presidential power.

 This is not going to be an easy ride, and it is probably not going to be a ride that is going to be settled anytime soon. And that’s a confrontation that will be overhanging all the work of the new Congress elected in ’26—work that I’ll be discussing with my guest this week, Neera Tanden.

[Music]

Frum: Neera Tanden was born in Bedford, Massachusetts, to parents who immigrated from India. After her parents’ divorce, Neera’s mother raised two children on public assistance and food stamps before finding work to support her family. Tanden has said that experience shaped her belief in what government can and should do.

Tanden went from UCLA to Yale Law School and then into the Clinton White House, where she worked on domestic policy in the First Lady’s office. She followed Hillary Clinton to the Senate as legislative director, ran policy for Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign, and after the primary did the same job for Barack Obama. At the Obama administration’s Department of Health and Human Services, Neera Tanden worked on the Affordable Care Act. Upon leaving government, she led the Center for American Progress for a decade, then served President Biden as staff secretary and director for the Domestic Policy Council. Since 2025, she has resumed her work as president and chief executive officer of the Center for American Progress.

Neera Tanden, thank you so much for joining me today.

Neera Tanden: Great to be with you, David.

Frum: All right, so I’m going to start with a personal question, if I may. So we are all spending—this is one of Elon Musk’s good works; he’s damaged Twitter so badly we all spend less time there, which is a great thing for ourselves and for humanity. But I do still spend some time there. And when I do, I see that you are a very frequent target of co-Democrats, co-progressives, in a way that—look, I’m an outsider to Democratic Party tribalism, but I find it kind of baffling. I mean, in all our encounters, I find you a cheerful, optimistic, and welcoming person. And yet I read some of these Twitter accounts or X accounts, and they talk about you more than President Trump, than any member of the Trump Cabinet, than any policy issue they seem to care about. So decode this for me. Why sunny you? Why are you this target?

Tanden: (Laughs.) I would like—I’m so happy that you’re affirming that I’m a sunny person. I appreciate that.

I think one of the challenges of our time is that sometimes factional fights are more important to people than party fights. So I do find it odd that there are groups of people who, in the broad tent that I’m in—you know, in the kind of Democratic Party or probably adjacent to the Democratic Party, to the left of me—who think of me as a greater threat to the republic than Donald Trump or Pete Hegseth or others. And I think actually you see a little of this in European politics, which you know about, which is sometimes that the parties that are nominally aligned—the Greens and the Social Democrats—can be even more intensely opposed.

But, I hope, actually, my deepest hope, is that as we now have very strong Democratic majorities, people could actually focus on constructive efforts to move the country forward than destructive efforts.

And I guess there would be one strand. Like, I understand that people feel that the quote-unquote “establishment” failed when Trump was reelected, but I think this is also a question about what happens going forward. Because as I said elsewhere, this was a very normie election. A lot of big-tent Democrats won across the country, and they won in red states. And this whole argument of whether you should just go to the base or go to the center or try to reach out to Republicans was really kind of smashed by the likes of Roy Cooper and James Talarico, who were able to do both. They suffered no loss with their base.

So anyway, my hope is that this moves—these calcified debates of the past kind of move on.

Frum: Well, let me go again, looking for just a map to understand this.

Presuming your detractors are not foolish people or not ignorant people, not unaware of where their interests are, what’s driving them? Why are you and whatever you represent, whatever that is, why does that make them so angry? Here you are—there’s this massive Democratic victory and up and down the ballot in places where no one imagined: Kansas. Kansas? Mississippi? I mean, Mississippi some people have imagined. No one ever imagined Kansas. People you like were the essential architects of this achievement. So what’s irking them?

Tanden: Look, I think that if you step back, a lot of people looked at the ’26 elections as a way to help drive the ’28 primaries. And I guess to step back, if you looked a year ago, probably, and thought this was going to be kind of a normal election, the three races that were in high contest were Maine, Michigan, and North Carolina. And those were heavily contested in the primaries. I really don’t want to relitigate these primaries. (Laughs.) But they were heavily contested in the primaries. And I think genuinely a lot of people were looking at ’26 and saying, you know, My faction can win in ’28.

There is a majority to behold out there, to actually end this MAGA nightmare if we try to build a broad tent. And you and I have talked about things like this for over a decade. Which is there is a—you know, what was amazing about ’26 is, this election, is that it busted a lot of myths. And one of those myths is that it’s impossible to attract any Republicans ever to come against Trump. And we saw upwards of 3 million Republicans voted for a Democrat who was sane and rational, and those were non-MAGA Republicans. And that’s not the most important part of the coalition. All the parts of the big-tent coalition is important. But I think there’s a group on the hard left who really doesn’t want a big-tent party. And so they’re pretty vicious in arguing against it. And I’m not running for office, so people can yell at me on Twitter, and I’m going to say what I believe in regardless of how much people yell at me.

Frum: Well, look; the parallels between the parties are not exact. But let me offer you an experience with factionalism from the Republican world, and tell me if this reminds you of anything you see.

I was involved in Republican politics from knocking on doors to other ways from the first Reagan-Bush campaign until very recent times. And to simplify a lot, there was sort of the mainstream Republican Party, which was a very business-oriented party about making conditions easier to start businesses—to save, to invest, to expand the American economy—and with an assertive foreign policy behind that.

And then there were these weirdo factions, and they often said pretty distressing and disgusting things. But everyone is, Look, we all agree about the Supreme Court and abortion and those things, and so they’re part of the coalition. How much harm can they do? After all, there’s so few of them.

And then one day we discovered they had the keys to the house, and we were all locked out. (Laughs.) It turned out they’re unchecked; their numbers did grow. The mistakes of the mainstream Republican Party helped them, too. And suddenly factional politics was the most important politics there was. And a lot of the story of American politics in the past decade has been what it means when a previously small faction, previously minority faction within one of the two great parties, gets the ascendancy within that party.

Any parallels there that anybody should be thinking about?

Tanden: I mean, this is why I think ’26 was so important. This election was so important.

Because over the last year and a half, we’ve had debates like: Who speaks for the Democratic Party? What is the Democratic Party? And, you know, some of the people who yell at me the most are the people who’ve claimed that they speak for the Democratic Party, that there’s an insurgency in the party, and that they are the new—that they represent everybody. And part of why there have been these conflicts—and I have a kind of guy who rails at me every day, who’s a Twitch streamer from California—is because I have tried to say, particularly when the rhetoric is really extreme. You know, as I’ve said before, I believe in a big tent. But the tent pole of the Democratic Party is against, should be against, any form of prejudice. And when I’ve said, you know, The people who have extremist rhetoric do not speak for basically the Democratic Party, that is when I have kind of gotten the most attacks.

And I have actually looked at this entire experience from the vantage point of looking at the Republican Party, where it’s exactly as you said. MAGA was a faction that grew and grew and grew, and the sort of mainstream Republicans were kind of overtaken. And I think this is really important. Because it’s actually—of the people, the Republicans who voted for Democrats, they were the non-MAGA Republicans in the country. I mean, lots of non-MAGA Republicans voted for Republicans. But the group of Republicans who moved were the people who were outside of this, who have always been outside the MAGA faction within the Republican Party.

And my actual long-term view about the country is that it is a pathway to violence and destruction of a great country to just be continually two hard factions against each other. And the actual way to address the MAGA threat in the country is to create a big-tent coalition that includes the left. Let me say that again: includes the left. But also includes Democrats, independents, and some Republicans. And I think one of the reasons people get angry is because they have argued for a decade there is no possibility to form a pro-democracy big-tent coalition, and they were proven wrong.

Frum: Well, let me ask you a question about how factionalism will interact with the agenda of the next Congress.

Tanden: Yeah.

Frum: So, let me start from sort of the left point of view, and make the best case for what they would say should happen in the next two years, as I understand their best case. And their best case, as I understand it, goes something like this.

Donald Trump is not an aberration. Donald Trump is not a fluke. Donald Trump capitalized on defects in the way American society is organized. And until you address those defects, you’re going to get Trump, Trump, Trump, Trump, Trump. Or, you know, various forms of Trump-like politics. And if you do address those defects, you don’t have to worry about Trump. He’ll just fade away, because you’ve purified the water from which Trumpism was the polluted stream.

And since many of the people who are the core of the MAGA support are people who were, at least in the first Trump term, people who had some kind of economic distress, we can reach those people, if we just don’t tell them they were wrong about Trump.

So therefore, to build on this theory—if this is their theory of the case—the smart play in the next two years is not to focus on Trump’s corruption. Not to try—you just, at Center for American Progress, unveiled a big anti-corruption legislative agenda. Not to waste time on those things. Just treat the mildest or the most superficial symptoms. Let’s spend our time and energy dealing with the deep discontents of American society, and then Trumpism will fade away as if it had never been there.

And that is an ideological dispute. That’s a factional dispute, but that’s one with real-world consequences, because if the left is right, you’re wasting your time with your anti-corruption agenda. And if you are right—that the anti-corruption agenda is important—then their whole theory of where Trump came from and why he was important and successful, their theory is wrong.

Tanden: I actually agree with a lot of the left critique. Which is: I think it’s very reasonable to think something is fundamentally broken in this country if you have Donald Trump. I mean, this is a country that has manifested not just great presidents, but world-historic great leaders, you know? During the—this is what I did during the Civil War. We, before the Civil War, we manifested just a great leader: Abraham Lincoln. And ahead of the Depression and World War II, we manifested, you know, FDR. Who—maybe a different leader would not have got us through both the Great Depression and World War II.

And we have now, amongst one of the worst people around here, as our president. And he’s been around for 10 years. And I think in the first term you could say, Well, that was an aberration. Comey. You know, whatever. Like, he was close. Hillary won the popular vote. This isn’t a mandate. But then, this guy who’s been around for 10 years.

And I want to say affirmatively: I agree for 2028 that we have to address some systemic problems in the country. Now, where I think the left gets this wrong is that they believe that working-class voters are kind of closet socialists, and they’re really not, as you saw. Because Democrats—these candidates who did the best with working-class voters last week amongst Democrats were people like James Talarico and Roy Cooper and Josh Turek and Annie Andrews and Scott Colom. I mean, the people who were able to assemble a coalition; that had a big increase in working-class voters of all races, actually for the most part, by having a populist but practical agenda. And also marrying this with postures on what I call security-related issues—crime, immigration—that were more moderate than where the party has been.

And this is what I think is where people are kind of talking past each other. Which is, I think people should actually spend a lot of time with working-class voters in focus groups and elsewhere, and you’ll see that those voters actually have a lot of concerns about the Democratic Party and some of the left of the Democratic Party.

But my take of this is that, I think, you don’t have to choose. The working-class people in America—

Frum: I want to make the best case this—okay, having done the steel-man version of the left’s case, let me make the steel-man version of the case against them. Which is: Does France have universal health care? Yeah. Is France probably on the verge of electing a neofascist president? Yes. Does Germany have a relatively narrow distribution of income? Yes. Which party is making the most dramatic gains in German politics? Their far-right party. All over the continent of Europe, we see they have the institutions that the American left wants, and they discover those are not, in fact, impediments to the rise of these extremist parties.

So whatever the cause is, it’s not the things that the left says. If, let’s say, Trump had been a little savvier and had left the Affordable Care Act alone, and said, You know what? That’s not where I’m going to spend my energy. I’m going to leave us; be the country that got down to what? In the Biden administration, what, 8 percent of Americans did not have health insurance of one form or another? An all-time low.

More health-care security than Americans have had ever in the history of the United States. And you got Trump winning a bigger victory in ’24, not a lesser victory.

So that theory of the case just seems a wrong explanation of where Trump comes from, and why Trump happens. And why his cognates in France and Germany—again, universal health coverage, narrow distribution of income. They’re not immune either.

Tanden: Yeah. So I think this is exactly right, but it’s a combination of issues.

So another way of saying what you’re saying is you actually—when you look at Europe, what’s really surprising is the countries with the lowest levels of inequality, the Gini coefficient, the sort of Nordic countries; many of those countries are experiencing a rise of the far right. And actually some of the countries that have higher levels of inequality, more in Southern Europe, have actually been able to hold fast against it.

So I really don’t think that inequality itself is the only driver. There’s obviously, you know—the far right is taking advantage of concerns about sort of legitimate concerns about sovereignty that they then kind of weaponize around immigrants and other issues. And I genuinely think these issues are intertwined in the U.S., right?

So, what is MAGA? MAGA is a concern, I think, fundamentally animated by a form of anxiety amongst white people about losing political and economic power. Like, whether you call it white nationalism or other things, an extreme form of this, which is animated by “Great Replacement” theory and other things. Which you think are kind of wacky theories—and then you realize the vice president of the United States talks about them all the time. But I think this is kind of a mixture of race and economics. And I don’t know how to unpack that.

What I do think is a case that we should address, and we can address these—I mean, the way I talk about these things is, America needs—it is the case that a lot of things are broken in the country, and we need a politics of transformation. But that, it is not necessarily a politics of radicalization, you know?

I think a lot of every election has been a “change election” since 2006. The only exception was Barack Obama’s reelection in 2012. But that’s like—we’re going through 20 years of change elections. Obviously, people are unhappy with the status quo. You know, there’s a million statistics for that.

But I also think one statistic that is really important in the United States—and I think is perhaps under-discussed—is since 2017, we have near consensus in the United States that, like, 75 percent of Americans believe that their children will be worse off than them. And that has been true every year since. It’s either 75 or 80 percent.

And my view is that in a country like America, which is very heterogeneous, what actually kind of pulls us together is this idea that this is a country that you can go as far as your talents take you. And when that belief so deeply erodes for multiple reasons, the bottom 50 percent are more stuck than they used to be. Whatever, a variety of factors—technology, social media scaring us all the time. But that belief—people losing faith in that belief creates a pessimism that I do think creates a space for the fear and the hate of the last 10 years.

Frum: Let me test another theory on you. Which is again counter to what you mentioned in the last answer, some points of agreement with the left analysis. Let me throw in another way of complicating this.

You mentioned that you thought of MAGA as an expression of anxiety by white people about becoming a minority. And yet, we see that Donald Trump has been the most successful racial-crossover Republican since Dwight Eisenhower maybe. And in 2024, especially, that he made big gains with Latinos and Blacks. Caveat. What Trump is illustrating is not widening racial resentment, which is the left’s theory of the world requires him to be. He’s actually casting light on widening sexual or gender resentments. That he got his gains among Latinos and even among African Americans among men—not among women.

Men and women are voting more and more apart than ever before. And maybe that’s why you and Hillary Clinton and Kamala Harris are such violent targets from people on the left. Is that, the changes in the economy, the changes in the opportunities, the changes in psychic income and social status are working in ways that disadvantage men of all races as compared to women of all races, including people online of all races. And that there’s a kinda free-floating sexual resentment.

One more point on this. It was very striking when I listened to J. D. Vance talk—and Vance tries to turn Trump’s instincts into some kind of intellectual system. Vance is an intellectual, for better or worse. His theory of the American economy is: We need to find some ways to make more of the jobs that enhance male incomes. Factory work, mining, oil and gas. Those are sectors that offer—or that seem to offer, or that used to offer—big incomes to non-college-educated physical laborers, predominantly men. And we need to de-emphasize and indeed insult the jobs in offices that we associate—and social services—that we associate with female labor.

And that’s, I would submit, one reason why when people like you speak, you are such targets.

Tanden: I mean, ironically, I feel like I get targeted a little less from MAGA than I do, definitely get targeted from the left.

Frum: No, I said this comes—this is universal. This is on the left. Left-wing men are no less angry at women than right-wing men are.

Tanden: I think there’s a lot to this, okay? You know, I mean, if you think of societal changes, there—it’s hard, you know, it’s hard to understate how gender equality is—how, you know, radical that idea is. And really just a very recent phenomenon in all of human history, right? I mean, the gender revolution of the last, you know, 80, 100 years or so has upturned a two, three, four thousand—depending on what society you believe you’re talking about—a kind of global phenomenon. In almost every culture you had basically patriarchy: male domination of almost every institution.

And I fundamentally believe this is what is amazing about this revolution is how little violence has happened. I mean, now you could argue various cultures around the world are expressing their violence in different ways, and there is obviously huge amounts of backlash. But just at the sort of atomic level of society, having women and men equal or perceived to be equal or have equal rights under the law is really just a very modern convention.

And so I absolutely believe that there are elements of backlash in all of our politics. And I 100 percent believe that it’s not really a coincidence that the Democratic Party put up three people against Donald Trump, and the guy won. So, you know, two women—very qualified, very different ways, but very qualified—lost. And lost close elections, but still lost. And the guy, you know, the older guy won.

But you know, what I think is also just very interesting about this is—you are right, for a moment in time. Which is: Donald Trump assembled a coalition for 2024. And every coalition is made up of different people, and I think you have one explanation. A lot of the voters of color, he showed up. He did really well in ’24 with Latinos; you’re right, mostly men. Some Black men. A lot of young people, particularly men. And then he did really well with Asians, and the gender difference wasn’t so great there, but still disproportionately Asian.

But what’s also fascinating about Trump is that he lost those voters so quickly. I mean, if you look at the last two years, he kind of lost the people who swung to him in the first year. And then where the cracks really came in his own coalition have been over the last six, eight months, since the Iran war. So by last winter, he was already losing the Latinos who voted for him, the Asians who voted for him, and the young people who voted for him. And the reason why this was not just a blue wave but an actual blue tsunami is because he lost some group of people who’d voted for him three times—voted for a Democrat.

Frum: I think we all understand why that is. He was elected in 2024. His strongest message, I think most people would agree, was: Prices got out of control post-COVID. Biden policies did not arrest the inflation; in some ways made it worse. So I’m going to fix the prices.

And then Trump proceeded to impose tariffs, which raises prices. Have this vast misdirected and brutal immigration crackdown, which not only pushed out of the country people who shouldn’t be here, but frightened even people who have temporary protected status and other bases; frightened them away from coming to workforces.

So raise tariffs, shrink the labor supply, huge deficits, $2 trillion of deficits. And with the One Big Beautiful Bill, those $2 trillion deficits are here forever, with no plan ever to fix them. And attack the independence of the Federal Reserve, so that markets get the idea the Federal Reserve governors who don’t deliver inflation are going to prison maybe. And so every time there was a button to press that said “inflation”/“no inflation,” Trump pressed the “inflation” button. And what do you know? United States got inflation.

So here’s the hard question. The Democrats won in ’26 on a message of “lots more spending, no tax increases for anyone except billionaires.” And some were against the tariffs, but not all. And what’s the Democratic plan? And the Democratic plan is to rename inflation “affordability,” because if you rename it, inflation, as sort of affordability, then subsidies can begin to look like an answer. Subsidies do create the appearance that those few items that are subsidized are more affordable. But it makes the inflation problem worse, because spending and taxing are ever more misaligned. Democrats are a party that’s had a problem thinking seriously about inflation, or at least not thinking—they’re great at thinking about it—but doing something about inflation.

Tanden: I really have a very different analysis, actually.

I think what’s really interesting in these swing districts and swing states is kind of the uniformity of the message across the board. And these are people who are running in states that have voted for Republicans, and districts that have voted for Republicans—not by one point or three points or five points, but by 10 points, 15 points, 20 points. And they all recognize that.

And there was for, particularly for the kind of moderates who ran and won, they had a very uniform message about costs and inflation and deficits. And they actually, most of them, talked about how important deficit reduction is. They talked about how the tariffs were dumb. Trump’s tariffs, the whole tariff regime was a bad idea. They talked about the Iran war, and how it was a bad idea. And actually they talked about—they had specific ideas on health care and other issues, believing in universal health care. But their actual ideas they put forward ranged from a public option perhaps, but much more on how we can lower health-care costs.

And health care is a great example where you do not need to spend more money. There’s a lot more money in the system. CAP has a plan to lower premiums by $1,000 by kind of getting control of providers. So I disagree that you actually had a lot of people promising to spend a lot more money. I didn’t really see that on the campaign trail.

What they did argue for—and in fact, many of them kind of argued “abundance plus,” like on housing. You know: Make it easier to build, but just ensure that renters and homeowners get some actual benefit from increasing building.

And I think that’s going to be a very interesting discourse in the primaries going forward. Which is, do you want to put forward ideas that can attract the big tent and win a gigantic election? Or do we wanna go back to this idea of 50/50 elections, where we’re just kind of talking to our base? And I did a speech at the National Press Club recently where I really articulated the case for stretching ourselves to have a big-tent election, where you build on these gains and don’t retreat from them, and the lessons we can learn from that.

And I guess my view of this is: I think there is a populism in the country, and we shouldn’t ignore it. But that populism is really about working-class people feeling like they can’t make ends meet, and that’s an affordability issue and kind of an incomes issue, and I think we should try to deal with both of those. And particularly in the next Congress focus on costs, which actually unites everybody. Lefty candidates ran on lowering costs. [Senator-Elect] Abdul El-Sayed, in the last two months of that election, focused every day on costs, and the Canadian tariffs really helped him there.

So I actually think there is a through line across all of this, and it is to have a Congress that is looking and acting like addressing the costs that are making people feel like they can’t keep their heads above water is the most important goal for officeholders.

Frum: One of the themes that was struck, sounded by many of the red-state-winning Democrats—I have heard tell Senator-Elect Talarico say this, others too, and others may have said it whom I didn’t notice—was that they would work with President Trump where possible to, on common goals. Do you think that’s realistic? The president has just picked Stephen Miller as his chief of staff. We are still in the very early days of learning about the Nvidia scandal, but it does look like something really bad happened inside the Trump administration.

You’ve heard from a White House legal team that they don’t want to comply with any subpoenas, and in fact, they would like to bring criminal process members of Congress who ask them, ask questions that the White House doesn’t think should be asked. I mean, is this talk of working with the president—is that something that was necessary to say on the campaign trail? Do you see any hope it could be achieved? Or is the president just going to have a psychic meltdown that makes it impossible to work with him no matter how hard you try?

Tanden: You know, I think voters are actually pretty smart on these things.

I mean, they know Trump is still president, right? So they’re not sitting around thinking, like, Oh, like a new Democratic Congress, even with a strong majority, means Donald Trump isn’t president anymore.

I guess I think this question is entirely up to Trump. I mean, here’s my view of this whole situation with Trump. Which is, I kind of think, politics is kind of human psychology on a mass scale. And if you’re a person and you ask someone to do something like focus in on your needs—like actually care about what inflation is like, instead of a ballroom and whatever level of corruption—and you ask many times, and you send lots of signals, and then you really take a decisive action, which is you have a big election.

And then that guy, that person, just ignores the entire election. Stephen Miller, making him chief of staff—does seem like you’re kind of, for lack of a better term, giving the finger to voters.

So, I feel like when that happens in politics, people just get angrier and angrier. So I guess this, again—like to get to my whole MAGA point—fundamentally what is going to happen here is going to be determined by Trump’s mental state and the Republican Party. And they have to decide whether they want to exercise any power over this guy. And that’s a call for them.

I guess to me, what voters will hold Democrats accountable for, particularly in these red states, is like, living up to what they said they would be. Which is: people who are focused on the needs of Texas and not either political party. Which means extending your hand. But if Trump doesn’t take it, no one’s going to hold James Talarico responsible for Trump’s decisions.

Frum: Let me ask you, in the brief time we have left, about 2028. I’m not going to ask you who you like, because I know you institutionally can’t and mustn’t answer that question. But I would like to ask you what you like. If you were writing the job description for the person who would be the most effective nominee in 2028, what would that job description sound like? What kind of person should it be?

Tanden: Oh, this is a great question. I think the most important ingredient to me is a person who can articulate a vision and build a coalition that extends the gains and doesn’t retreat from them.

And I think there are all different kinds of candidates who can do that, and you can be from a liberal state or a moderate state. I think it really is a combination of having a vision that speaks to the hunger in the country for a different kind of country, and I think also addresses some of these kinds of systemic challenges, but does it in a way that attracts a big tent.

And, a reminder to me, I think again of an important thing is—as a person who lived, who worked for Hillary Clinton in the forever primaries in 2007 and 2008, and then went to go work for Barack Obama. That was another Democratic primary that came after a big win—not as historic as this one—but a pretty important and big win, where the country was already deciding that George Bush’s second term was a failure.

But what the Democratic primary actually—a lot of big strain in the Democratic primary was really about who could attract independents, who could win a big election. Barack Obama had voted against the Iraq War, and that was a big part of his campaign. But he talked every day about his capability and ability to attract independents. And this will be a big question for the Democratic Party. Do you want to have candidates who check every box of what we love? Or do you want a candidate who can pull together a coalition, like James Talarico did in Texas and Roy Cooper did even, and Annie Andrews did? Which is to build a coalition that can actually have such a big election that we may end this decade of polarization and move to a better, move to basically a better country.

Frum: Well, let me suggest an image, and tell me if you agree or disagree with this. My top want for a Democratic candidate in 2028—and assuming that J. D. Vance, with his protectionism and isolationism and ever less carefully veiled anti-Semitism, is the Republican nominee, I’ll assume I’ll be voting for that 2028 nominee, probably. My request would be someone who comes from a state where they understand that buses can hit you from both directions. If you come from Massachusetts or New York or California, you’re learned to looking over your left shoulder for the bus, and if there’s no bus on the left, you’re fine. You can cross the street. You’re safe. And I think that’s a little bit what happened to Vice President Harris; she had spent her career learning to look left before crossing the street. And then pow, the bus hit her from the right, and she didn’t quite know what to do or how to do it. And I would be looking for people who know the buses come from both directions, and the buses on the right are probably bigger and meaner.

So you have to have played in that kind of political environment in a competitive state, not in a one-party state.

Tanden: The only thing I would add there is: We’ve had leaders who come from both. And before Barack Obama, there was just a slew of Democrats from southern states, kind of with this theory of being able to talk to the whole country.

But I think Obama also proved it’s important to have the ideas and the ability to communicate them. And I think you’re right that people have to be able to navigate both of those issues.

Frum: Barack Obama made his career when Illinois was a much more competitive state than it is today. And Illinois had a succession of Republican governors in the ’90s and early 2000s.

Tanden: In fact, it had Republican governors until quite recently, until J. B. Pritzker. I mean, they had one before, even in the 2000s.

I guess my view is that I don’t hold it against someone if they come from a state like California or, you know, like New York or something like that.

I do think it’s much more important to think about: Do you understand the theory of the case? Which is, you know—I said this in this election cycle, and it’s true for every election cycle in my view—sitting around arguing forever about who the nominee is and then losing the general election is a waste of time.

So, the thing that is the difference between Democrats and Republicans today is that in most parts of the country—and really, kind of everywhere—Democrats are still trying to navigate who’s the best person to win the general election. And that has not been where the Republican Party is, but it is where the Democratic Party is still to this day.

Liberals are still trying to think through who is the best person to win in a state, and they came up with a lot of great candidates around the country to do that, and I hope they do that again in 2028 and with a bigger eye toward a much bigger victory.

Frum: Neera, thank you so much for making time for me today.

You began by saying you are resolving to spend less time on Twitter. It’ll be less fun for everybody. Probably wiser for you. (Laughs.) Less disagreeable for you, but less fun for everybody else.

Tanden: We’ll all sing “Kumbaya” in January. Seems very likely.

Frum: Thanks so much for joining me today.

[Music]

Frum:  Thanks to Neera Tanden for joining me this week on The David Frum Show.

As I said at the top of the show, this week’s book is The Literary Underground of the Old Regime by Robert Darnton, published by Harvard University Press in 1982. The Literary Underground of the Old Regime is a collection of essays by the great historian of France, Robert Darnton, that study the kind of pamphlet literature of France in the years before the French Revolution. Now, this may seem a topic a little off the beaten track, but I promise you, if you stick with it, you will find some truths that are applicable to our situation today.

So, as we all probably learned in school or college there’s a general view that the French Revolution that began in 1789 was precipitated, or the way was prepared, by the writings of philosophers: Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, people like that. High-minded, profound writers that we remain in currency to this day.

And Darnton doesn’t want to detract from those people at all. But he suggests you can learn a lot about why the French Revolution happened as it did, and when it did, by studying not the great writers but the kind of trashy writers. People published pamphlets and papers in cheap editions, sometimes outside of France where they were forbidden by the censor and smuggled into France. And Darnton studies these papers—which were smut and scandal and gossip—to get insights into what the everyday talk of French people was in the years before the French Revolution.

There was a lively trade in pornography. There was a lively trade, often with a kind of anti-clerical edge, that these people would write about pornography involving monks and nuns. Both is what the books would sell because of their pornographic quality, but they’d make a kind of political point about goings-on in the church. They were often libels and slanders against eminent people in the regime, making up stories, sometimes partly true, often completely false, about the king and the queen and the royal family and other high aristocrats. And these things became part of the traffic of the mind of French people, especially Parisian people, in the years before the French Revolution.

Now, since The Literary Underground of the Old Regime was published in 1982, some scholars have questioned Darnton’s thesis. There have been now attempts to use large language models and deep studies of archives to argue that actually the French read less smut and more religion before the French Revolution than Darnton’s book allows. Irritatingly, the French are refusing to live up to their stereotype in this case. (Laughs.) But—however the balance between the devotional material and the smut and scandal was—the smut and scandal was really there, and it was really important. And it’s very easy to lose sight of it from this distance in time where Voltaire remains in print and the smut and scandal does not.

So why should you care about this? I mean, unless you’re very enthusiastic about the French Revolution, why should you care? Well, I’ve been thinking a lot about what future generations will make of our times and what’s going on now. Now, 150, 200 years from now, I’m confident that if The Atlantic is not still in business—and we hope it will be—that the catalog of The Atlantic will remain in business, and you can read my articles and those of my colleagues. And The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal and The Financial Times; those probably will be archived in some way, too. Will there be an archive of the online monologues of Alex Jones, however? Will there be online monologues of the people even less famous than Alex Jones who are even wilder and more crazy? Maybe not. Maybe those things will be lost to history.

But as you live through it now—without in any way denying the enormous importance of what we do at The Atlantic—a lot of the mental furniture of Americans comes not from places like The Atlantic, but from smut and scandal and conspiracy theories and mania. And what a work of historical research it will be to uncover, and what a reminder of how things matter to be recalled that before the French Revolution, it wasn’t just The Atlantics that mattered, it was the Alex Joneses, too, and we need to study them all. However unattractive those truths are, they are part of the mental furniture of our times.

So, read Robert Darnton to get a perspective on what is happening now, and then look at what is happening now with a cooler eye. And remember that, as we know, that the events of our time are driven not just by what is true, but by what is made up; not just by what can be proven, but what is often wildly alleged. Not just by truths and arguments, but by manias and delusions and rumors. That’s part of the story of our times, too, whether we like it or not. And we can get a better perspective on our times by looking at how these kinds of behaviors worked out in times past.

That’s it for this week’s edition of The David Frum Show. Thanks so much for joining me today. Remember, as always, the best way to support the work of this program is by subscribing to The Atlantic. I sincerely hope you will consider doing that. That supports my work and all of my wonderful colleagues. See you soon here on The David Frum Show. Thanks so much. Bye-bye.

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